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MICHAEL IMELTSNER t
The treatment accorded Negroes by southern medical facilities-
general hospitals, custodial institutions, health centers, nursing homes,
clinics-reflects a striking contradiction between law and practice, a
variance which exemplifies the historic method of accommodating
Negro claims to equality: incorporation of egalitarian principles in
legal norms, and administrative tolerance of actual inequality.1 From
Reconstruction, those desiring to improve the status of the Negro have
sought to create an arsenal of civil rights and attendant remedies
enforceable by federal power. Congressional action, however, has not
always produced expected change. No doubt this is partially a conse-
quence of limitations inherent in particular legislative formulations.
Exclusion of Negroes from jury service, for example, has been pro-
hibited by federal law since 1875,2 but the persons responsible for the
enforcement of this provision apparently consider it useless.' Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting racial and other dis-
crimination in employment, was crippled by amendments supposedly
necessary to obtain Senate approval.4  It would not be accurate,
however, to ascribe the failure of civil rights legislation to achieve
stated objectives solely to inherent defects or, for that matter, to re-
sistance encountered from those hostile to the new rights. In order
to discover the roots of continued resistance to legislatively endorsed
goals, attention has shifted to focus on administration and the extent
to which federal bureaucrats have taken an unduly restrictive view
of their power and responsibility to end racial discrimination. This
administrative tolerance of legislatively proscribed discrimination has
t A.B. 1957, Oberlin College. LL.B. 1960, Yale University. Member, New York
Bar. Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
1 The tradition found its quintessential expression in the School Desegregation
Cases where desegregation "with all deliberate speed," justified in the second case,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), because of transitional administrative
problems, served to accommodate the opponents of the first case, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by delaying significant nonracial pupil and teacher assign-
ment for at least a generation.
218 U.S.C. § 243 (1964). The only recorded use of the statute is described in
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
8 5 U.S. COmm'N ox CiVIL RIGHTS ANN. REP. 95-103 (1961).
478 Stat 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964) ; see Berg, Equal Eva-
ployment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 62,
68 (1964); Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 729 (1965).
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serious consequences. 5 Unfortunately, public scrutiny is often stifled
by the low visibility of administrative decision-making. Uncertainty
as to what has and has not been accomplished blocks intelligent dis-
cussion and planning. This article attempts to set forth the records
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Depart-
ment of Justice with respect to their obligations to eliminate racial
discrimination in governmental and publicly assisted medical facilities.'
Although the character of this response is a matter which has received
coverage in the press and is much discussed at conferences between
departmental representatives and civil rights groups, systematic treat-
ment and comparison with nongovernmental desegregation efforts is
desirable.
The constitutional and statutory obligation of the federal govern-
ment to eliminate racial discrimination in provision of medical facilities
and services is clear. Appellate courts have found racial discrimination
by governmentally owned, operated or subsidized hospitals to violate
the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits racial exclusion from participation, denial of benefits
or discrimination "under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance" and delegates to federal administrators ample
power to enforce racial equality by refusal, withdrawal or termination
of funds or by litigation.' Title III of the Civil Rights Act empowers
5 It is apparent that tolerance of a wide gap between legal and behavioral norms
fosters a corrosive cynicism among Negroes. Paradoxically, it also produces a subtle
form of racism among whites. Told that Negroes have obtained legal rights to full
equality, some explain continued de facto inequality in terms of the Negro's capacity
or interest rather than as the product of discrimination and poverty. Once the faulty
premise is accepted, hostility to expressions of Negro frustration is the result, a
response which itself is likely to increase Negro frustration.
IDuring the debate in the Senate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator
Humphrey stated:
"Some Federal agencies appear to have been reluctant to act in this area.
Title VI will require them to act. Its enactment will thus serve to insure
uniformity and permanence to the nondiscrimination policy."
That is my view. So it is my view that the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare should clarify its former ambivalence in this connection and
its ambiguity of statement and policy and should make sure that the precise
language here set forth-and the language of Title VI is precise-is ad-
hered to.
110 CtON. REc. 12720 (1964).
7 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). Although denial of certiorari is not usually
accorded weight as precedent, it is evident that the failure to review Simkins is of
more than usual significance, for, by refusing to 'grant certiorari, the Court upheld
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of an act of Congress. See also Flagler Hosp.,
Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965) ; 'f. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America,
Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1963).
878 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1964) ; 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13
(Supp. 1966).
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the Attorney General to bring suit to enjoin discrimination at public
facilities owned or operated by state governments.' Title IX au-
thorizes him to intervene in suits seeking relief from denial of equal
protection of the laws.'" Even the discriminators with whom we are
concerned primarily-southern medical facilities-have relinquished
such rights as they might assert to distinguish racially by executing
agreements with federal officers in which they pledge to eliminate
racial discrimination as a condition of receipt of federal funds, an
agreement which may be enforced by the United States in its courts."
A visitor to our shores, informed of these principles, would be
forgiven surprise at the distance practice lagged behind. Those who
cannot claim ignorance may only conclude dismally that in race re-
lations, law is a poor index of behavior. Despite the clarity of federal
law, thousands of medical facilities in southern and border states
segregate or exclude Negro patients, physicians and nurses or provide
them services and facilities inferior to those available to whites. 2 Al-
though the form varies from community to community, often from
hospital to hospital, disparity of treatment is as much a part of
southern custom in medical facilities as in schools; the variety of racial
distinctions encountered confirms the pervasiveness, if not the con-
sistency, of Jim Crow.3
When southern hospitals construct or modernize health facilities
the old building or portion of the building conventionally becomes a
restricted area. 4 Where a building or floor is shared, a hospital may
maintain separate wards, private or semi-private rooms, lavatories,
eating facilities, entrance ways, emergency rooms, maternity wards or
nurseries. Some hospitals provide one ambulance service for whites,
another for Negroes; others schedule out-patient clinics on "Negro"
9 78 Stat. 246 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1964).
3.078 Stat. 266 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §2000h-2 (1964).
1145 C.F.R. §80.4 (Supp. 1966). The required assurances may be found at 9
RAcE RE . L. REP. 1960 (1964).
' 2 While discrimination in health facilities is most noticeable in the South, it is,
like other varieties of racial discrimination, demonstrably present in many northern and
western communities. See Morris v. Chicago Hosp. Council, 9 RACE REL. L. REP.
1838 (1964) ; NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, HEALTH CARE AND THE NEGRo PoPuLATIoN
(1965) ; NEW YORK STATE ADvIsORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
REPORT ON BuFFALo: HEALTH FAcILrrIES (1964); NEW YORK STATE ADVISORY COMM.
TO THE U.S. COmm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON NEW YORK CITY: HEALTH
FACILITIES (1964).
18 Many southern states have required segregation in state mental hospitals and
sanitariums. GREENiBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 373 (1959); MuR-
RAY, STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR passim (1951). Segregation in nongovern-
mental hospitals, however, has been more a matter of custom than statutory command.
14The textual description of patterns of discrimination found in southern hospitals
is based on complaints filed with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare by
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the NAACP.
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and "white" days or rigidly segregate thermometers. A Florida hos-
pital developed the practice of placing Negroes in the basement unless
they were "prominent" and one Mississippi facility has refused to
permit Negroes to visit "white" wards. At many hospitals, when a
Negro seeks admission he is required to show greater financial security
than a white and is turned away if he does not demonstrate ability to
pay. Although refusal to admit Negro emergency patients is said to
be a thing of the past, an alarming number of seriously ill Negroes
are refused hospital admission until a guarantor of their fees can be
found. Segregation also means a gross disparity in physical condi-
tions and professional services: a surprising number of southern hos-
pitals force Negro patients-male and female-to use a single lavatory;
and a common method of obtaining rooms for whites is to move
Negro beds into hallways when the white section of the hospital has
been filled. Negro patients complain of antiquated facilities, poor
service and outright discourtesy from hospital personnel. 5
Discrimination against Negro professionals is also prevalent.
Negro physicians and dentists encounter difficulty in gaining free
access to hospital staffs, forcing them to turn patients over to white
physicians for hospitalization, much to their financial detriment, or
to offer treatment in private clinics which cannot offer the facilities
or services of government or community hospitals. The numerous
professional and educational benefits of affiliation with the American
Medical Association and American Dental Association are often
privileges restricted to white practitioners.'" If a hospital employs
Negro nurses (and many do not), they are rarely promoted to super-
visory positions and are often paid less than white nurses for the same
work.17  Despite a pressing national need, hospital-affiliated nursing
schools still exclude Negroes or minimize their numbers and few
southern hospitals train Negroes for expanding job opportunities in
15 The following practices of Atlanta's largest hospital were established in a
federal court suit: exclusion of Negro physicians from medical staff; assignment of
Negro patients to specified floors and rooms; separate clinics, rest-rooms, ambulance
service; operation of segregated nursing schools; and exclusion of Negroes from
medical technician training programs. Bell v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Authority, Civil
No. 7966, N.D. Ga., Feb. 23, 1965. Cf. U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL MRGHTs, TITLE VI
• . . ONE YEAR AFTER (1966).
16 Both organizations have adopted hortatory resolutions calling for nondiscrimina-
tory admission policies on the part of constituent societies, but have resisted efforts
to discipline the many affiliates who ignore them. As most county and state medical
and dental societies, affiliated with AMA and ADA, participate in the selection of
the state health officers who regulate their professions, admission policies are also
subject to constitutional standards and successful suit for injunctive relief. Hawkins
v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Bell v. Georgia Dental
Soc'y, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
17 Cf. Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.
1966) (Negro nurses discharged after protest of segregated cafeteria entitled to
reinstatement and back pay).
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technical fields, such as operation of X-ray machines and occupational
and vocational therapy..
8
The medical consequences of racial discrimination in health facili-
ties and services are not easily traced, but it is likely that the patterns
of discrimination described are in part responsible for high Negro
infant mortality and lower average life expectancy.'9 The costs in
terms of discomfort, worry, humiliation and pain, loss of earnings and
waste of human potential are nonetheless real for being immeasurable.20
Discrimination in medical facilities generated only a small volume
of litigation 21 and little public attention 2 until the 1963 decision of
the Fourth Circuit in the landmark case of Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital ' established widespread hospital desegregation as
an immediate goal of every civil rights organization. Between 1954
and 1962, two Greensboro, North Carolina, hospitals received approxi-
mately 3.2 million dollars from the United States in order to defray
construction costs of facilities for new patient care and nurses' train-
ing.24 Both refused treatment to Negroes desiring hospitalization and
excluded Negro physicians and dentists from staff affiliation-a pre-
requisite to placement of patients in the hospital. Although the racial
policies of both hospitals antedated receipt of federal funds, exclusion
18 These practices not only restrict the work opportunities of Negroes, denying
to them significant educational and financial rewards, but also withhold from their
communities the benefits of an increased number of trained professionals. The refusal
of Negro doctors, for example, to accept the conditions of practice in the South has,
over the last generation, reduced the number of Negro physicians in the region in
proportion to Negro population, and aggravated an already acute shortage of physicians.
See REITZES, NEGROES AND MEDICINE 272, 295, 316 (1958).
19 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 970 n.23 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGuE, HEALTH CARE
AND THE NEGRO PoPuLATIoN (1965) ; PErIGREw, A PROFILE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN
(1964) ; Fein, An Economic and Social Profile of the Negro American, 94 DAEDALuS
815, 817-24 (1965).
20 A full explanation of the persistence of discrimination with such disturbing
consequences would require an appraisal of resistance to equality in general as well
as responses to threatened desegregation of health institutions. It is plain, however,
that efforts to desegregate medical facilities, whether through persuasion or coercion
implicit in use of legal processes, are opposed long after resistance appears impractical.
2 Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 310 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1962) (preliminary in-
junction inappropriate; remanded for trial) ; Eaton v. Board of Managers, 261 F.2d
521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (insufficient "state action";
fourteenth amendment inapplicable); Wood v. Hogan, 215 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Va.
1963) (Hill-Burton hospital not subject to fourteenth amendment) ; Wood v. Vaughn,
209 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Va. 1962), aff'd sub nora. 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963)
(citizen-taxpayer has no standing to desegregate home for senile and aged).
22 Prior to 1964, federal law sanctioned racial discrimination in hospitals. The
Public Health Service took the view that the nondiscrimination clause of the Hill-
Burton Act, § 622, 60 Stat 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1964), applied
only to admission of Negro patients and the act itself expressly permitted waiver of
the clause even as applied to admissions in cases of "separate facilities" approved for
"separate population groups." See note 28 infra.
23 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
24 The funds received by Moses H. Cone Memorial and Wesley Long Hospitals
amounted to approximately 15% and 50% respectively of. the total cost of federally
aided construction.
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court also premised "state" and "federal action" on the Hill-Burton
provision which enabled the Greensboro hospitals to avoid giving an
assurance not to discriminate" and declared the language which sanc-
tioned segregation unconstitutional."
Simkins has not been restricted to hospitals authorized by Hill-
Burton to exclude Negroes totally. A number of district courts have
enjoined publicly owned and nongovernmental medical facilities from
segregation 34 as well as exclusion of Negro patients and professionals.35
The Fourth Circuit also extended the rule to a North Carolina hospital
which was not a Hill-Burton grantee but, among other interrelations
with government, had been forced to obtain a license because of the
state's Hill-Burton participation. 6  Now that payments under the
Medicare program have commenced, few medical facilities will be
beyond the reach of the federal equity power.3 7
particular projects within a state is governed by federal approved state plans. Hill-
Burton Act § 623, 60 Stat. 1044 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §291d (1964). See
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HILL-BuRTON PROGRAM-PROGRESS
REPORT, JULY 1, 1947-JuNE 30, 1961 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 880, 1961).
82 See note 28 supra.
33 323 F.2d at 969. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
As a result, the Surgeon General amended implementing regulations to require non-
discriminatory admission and treatment of Negro patients and professionals in all
Hill-Burton hospitals. 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1964). According to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, after the change in regulation sponsors of eight "separate
but equal" facilities, whose projects were still in varying stages of construction, were
required to execute nondiscriminatory assurances as a condition for continuing to
receive federal funds. However, projects already completed and the 835 "nondis-
criminatory" facilities under construction and receiving federal funds at that time were
unaffected by this ruling. The Public Health Service asked sponsors of the facilities
under construction to execute voluntary nondiscrimination assurances that staff privi-
leges would be available to all professionally qualified persons. Sponsors of almost
700 of these facilities agreed to do so. Although the Service sought these assurances
it did nothing to alter the prevailing southern unwillingness to implement the promises
made in them. U.S. COiM'N ON Civii. RIGHTS, SPECIAL PUB. No. 2 (1965).
34 Hayling v. Flagler, 344 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Burton v. Arkansas Tubercu-
losis Sanitorium, No. LR-66-C-51, E.D. Ark., May 3, 1966; Pringle v. State Tuber-
culosis Bd., No. 1044, N.D. Fla., Jan. 26, 1966 (declaratory judgment); Rackley v.
Board of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965) ; Rogers v. Druid City Hosp., 10
RACE REL. L. REP. 1273 (1965); Batts v. Dublin Gen. Hosp., No. 1110, E.D.N.C.,
Dec. 22, 1965; Lewter v. Lee Memorial Hosp., No. 65-47-Civ., M.D. Fla., Dec. 10,
1965; Mangrum v. Iredell Hosp., No. 519, W.D.N.C., Nov. 9, 1965; Hall v. Roanoke-
Chowan Hosp., No. 522, E.D.N.C., Sept. 7, 1965; Reynolds v. Anniston Memorial
Hosp., No. 65-206, N.D. Ala, Jun. 21, 1965; Bell v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Authority,
No. 7966, N.D. Ga., Feb. 23, 1965; Clayton v. Person County Hosp., No. C-137-D-64,
M.D.N.C., Oct. 28, 1964; Addison v. High Point Memorial Hosp., No. C-96-C-64,
M.D.N.C., Aug. 28, 1964; cf. Porter v. North Carolina Bd. of Control, No. C-123-
D-62, M.D.N.C., Mar. 28, 1963 (pre-Simkins declaration of unconstitutionality of
segregation in state mental institutions).3 5 Although Negro physicians have obtained full staff membership under the
Simkins theory, the extent to which Negro professionals are protected when a hospital
denies that exclusion has been racial presents troublesome questions which remain
unresolved. See Note, Working Rules for Assuring Nondiscrimination in Hospital
Administration, 74 YALE L.J. 151 (1964). The question is discussed in Cypress v.
Nonsectarian Hosp., 251 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va.), appeal docketed, No. 10672, 4th
Cir., 1966.386Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
37 Social Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified in scattered
sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.). Under Medicare Insurance, payments are conditioned
[Vo1.115:22
28 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
court also premised "state" and "federal action" on the Hill-Burton
provision which enabled the Greensboro hospitals to avoid giving an
assurance not to discriminate"2 and declared the language which sanc-
tioned segregation unconstitutional.3
Simkins has not been restricted to hospitals authorized by Hill-
Burton to exclude Negroes totally. A number of district courts have
enjoined publicly owned and nongovernmental medical facilities from
segregation 34 as well as exclusion of Negro patients and professionals.3
The Fourth Circuit also extended the rule to a North Carolina hospital
which was not a Hill-Burton grantee but, among other interrelations
with government, had been forced to obtain a license because of the
state's Hill-Burton participation.36 Now that payments under the
Medicare program have commenced, few medical facilities will be
beyond the reach of the federal equity power.3
particular projects within a state is governed by federal approved state plans. Hill-
Burton Act § 623, 60 Stat. 1044 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291d (1964). See
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HILL-BURTON PROGRAM-PROGRESS
REPORT, JULY 1, 1947-JuNE 30, 1961 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 880, 1961).
32 See note 28 supra.
33 323 F.2d at 969. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
As a result, the Surgeon General amended implementing regulations to require non-
discriminatory admission and treatment of Negro patients and professionals in all
Hill-Burton hospitals. 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1964). According to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, after the change in regulation sponsors of eight "separate
but equal" facilities, whose projects were still in varying stages of construction, were
required to execute nondiscriminatory assurances as a condition for continuing to
receive federal funds. However, projects already completed and the 835 "nondis-
criminatory" facilities under construction and receiving federal funds at that time were
unaffected by this ruling. The Public Health Service asked sponsors of the facilities
under construction to execute voluntary nondiscrimination assurances that staff privi-
leges would be available to all professionally qualified persons. Sponsors of almost
700 of these facilities agreed to do so. Although the Service sought these assurances
it did nothing to alter the prevailing southern unwillingness to implement the promises
made in them. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SPECIAL PUB. No. 2 (1965).
34 Hayling v. Flagler, 344 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Burton v. Arkansas Tubercu-
losis Sanitorium, No. LR-66-C-51, E.D. Ark., May 3, 1966; Pringle v. State Tuber-
culosis Bd., No. 1044, N.D. Fla., Jan. 26, 1966 (declaratory judgment) ; Rackley v.
Board of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965) ; Rogers v. Druid City Hosp., 10
RAcE REL. L. REP. 1273 (1965); Batts v. Dublin Gen. Hosp., No. 1110, E.D.N.C.,
Dec. 22, 1965; Lewter v. Lee Memorial Hosp., No. 65-47-Civ., M.D. Fla., Dec. 10,
1965; Mangrum v. Iredell Hosp., No. 519, W.D.N.C., Nov. 9, 1965; Hall v. Roanoke-
Chowan Hosp., No. 522, E.D.N.C., Sept. 7, 1965; Reynolds v. Anniston Memorial
Hosp., No. 65-206, N.D. Ala., Jun. 21, 1965; Bell v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Authority,
No. 7966, N.D. Ga., Feb. 23, 1965; Clayton v. Person County Hosp., No. C-137-D-64,
M.D.N.C., Oct. 28, 1964; Addison v. High Point Memorial Hosp., No. C-96-C-64,
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sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.). Under Medicare Insurance, payments are conditioned
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These actions have played a valuable role in eliminating specific
instances of discrimination, but, when compared to the size of the
problem, the number of Negroes affected by the cases is insignificant,
the rate of change disappointing.3 The impact of litigation has
primarily been to fix public attention on the extent of the problem and
the persistence of illegal segregation and its often startling consequences.
By exposing injustices that have been buried from view and by
educating and inspiring those who have attacked them, private litiga-
tion has helped to demonstrate the need for a nondiscrimination guar-
antee in federal programs and the need for an active role by the
Department of Justice.39 Continued use of litigation by Negroes at-
tests to the inability of the federal government to implement that
guarantee effectively, for although privately initiated federal court
actions cannot themselves eliminate widespread and ingrained racial
practices, they do demonstrate that inequality of treatment remains.
Private efforts to desegregate medical facilities labor under extreme
handicaps. In addition to a shortage of concerned litigants,40 suffi-
upon a hospital meeting a variety of health and safety requirements and exercising
its responsibility to discourage improper and unnecessary utilization of services and
facilities. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1861(e), 79 Stat. 314 (1965), 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (Supp. I, 1965). It would be difficult to distinguish Simkins and
Eaton in a suit against a hospital premised on receipt of Medicare payments. As
with Hill-Burton, federal funds under Medicare are disbursed to facilities which con-
form to federal standards in order to provide adequate hospital care to all persons
within the statutorily defined class of aged.
38 Private litigation in the best circumstances is costly and time consuming and
a difficult means of changing the behavior of large numbers of persons playing a
variety of roles. A privately initiated federal court suit for injunctive relief against
a medical facility raises particular difficulties. The primary object of discrimination
-the Negro patient-has but transient personal interest in or knowledge of the terms
and conditions of treatment in local hospitals. At the time his interest is greatest-
when he is ill-he is least likely to express interest in litigation. Negro physicians,
dentists and nurses have litigated the legality of hospital practices, such as restrictive
admission of professionals, but many are so successful within the confines of the
segregated systems that they have little incentive to change it. Others lag behind
the skills of better educated whites and hesitate to challenge racial barriers for fear
their ability will be questioned. Others are unable to overcome the imposing evi-
dentiary hurdle of proving they have been rejected for racial and not professional
reasons. Indeed, it is so difficult for private litigants and a district court to police
anything other than a nondiscriminatory admission policy that some hospitals have
continued to discriminate notwithstanding decrees ordering desegregation. One of
the hospitals involved in the Simkins case, Wesley Long of Greensboro, North Carolina,
has yet to admit Negroes to its medical staff and, because white physicians will not
admit their Negro patients, avoided desegregation.
39 Managers of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 used Simkins to bolster their case
for Title VI:
Title VI would override the "separate but equal" provisions now in the Hill-
Burton Act. The policy of the Title might be enforced here by requiring
the hospitals receiving Federal construction grants under the Hill-Burton Act
[to] agree not to exclude or segregate patients, or otherwise discriminate in
their treatment of patients, because of race, color or national origin. . ..
Any such discrimination is unconstitutional under the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Menzo-
ria Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (C.A. 4, 1963), certiorari denied, March 2, 1964.
110 CoNG. Rw. 6546 (1964). See also 110 CONG. REc. 12720 (1964).
40 See note 38 supra.
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cient legal and investigative manpower is unavailable; only a fraction
of the civil rights dollar may be committed to such litigation. It took
two of Atlanta's four civil rights lawyers three years to desegregate
that city's largest hospital. Throughout the suit they were hampered
by an inability to learn the extent to which the hospital had modified,
as it claimed, a variety of racial practices." Only investigative re-
sources of the kind available to the federal government could have
determined with any certainty whether the hospital had actually altered
ingrained racial practices or was merely making a show of change
while in litigation.
In theory, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 transcends the
limitations of privately initiated litigation by obligating the United
States to require nondiscrimination as a precondition to federal
assistance.' Although complaints from private parties are au-
thorized,4 3 they are envisaged as ancillary 44 to the duty of federal
administrators to require nondiscrimination as an integral part of the
funding process.45 Thus, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare early sought a written "assurance of nondiscrimination" from
hospitals and other health institutions,4" approval of which was neces-
sary for receipt of financial assistance.4" The Department quietly took
the position, however, that execution of a facially satisfactory assurance
would be accepted as sufficient unless victims of discrimination at-
tacked the finding. A national survey of hospital discrimination an-
nounced by the Department was never carried out.4" Actual (as
41 See note 15 supra.
4278 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d2; 45 C.F.R. § 80.4 (Supp. 1966).
43 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (Supp. 1966).
44 "We cannot rely solely-or even primarily-on the filing of complaints by those
who are the subjects of Title VI violations. The ultimate success of our Title VI
efforts will in large measure depend on how effectively the responsible departments
and agencies actually monitor compliance in the field." Letter From Attorney General
Katzenbach to the Heads of Twenty-One Departments and Agencies With Title VI
Responsibilities, December 27, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
45 "[E]ach department and agency with Title VI responsibilities should conduct
regular, systematic inspections for possible discrimination to insure that the require-
ments of Title VI are in fact being observed by recipients of Federal assistance."
Ibid. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.6 (Supp. 1966).
46 The Public Health Service, Office of Education, Vocational Rehabilitation
Administration, Welfare Administration and Social Security Administration administer
over forty major programs of federal financial assistance to medical facilities. Some
of the more prominent programs assist community health, community mental health
centers, construction, students, research, vocational education and rehabilitation, fami-
lies with dependent children and the aged, blind or disabled.
4145 C.F.R. §§80.4, 80.8(b) (Supp. 1966). For the text of the assurance and
the department's explanation, see 9 RAcE REI.. L. REP. 1960 (1964).
48 Quigley, Hospitals and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 57 J. NATL MED. Ass'N
455, 456-57 (1965).
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opposed to promised) compliance was converted from a precondition
to receipt of funds to a distant goal which the Department would
actively seek only if it received a complaint. 9 Unfortunately, the
Department's assumption that execution of a form eliminated en-
trenched discriminatory practices placed the burden to initiate com-
pliance not on the orderly processes of government but on the fortuities
of private circumstance. As of March 1, 1966, all but a fraction of
the facilities " whose racial practices were brought to governmental
attention " in this manner had been investigated." The following
table summarizes the performance of the Department:
TABLE I
TITLE VI PERFORMANCE OF
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
JULY 2, 1964 THROUGH MARCH 1, 1966
MEDICAL FACILITIES
Potential Discriminators ' 6,000
Refusal to File Nondiscrimination Assurance 100
Complaints Filed 350
Compliance Findings 100
Funds Cut Off 54  0
Funds Withheld 5  100
Table II illustrates the performance of the Department of Justice
with respect to medical facilities during the same period:
4 9 If such a construction were anything but the product of the most compelling
administrative necessity, it would appear totally contrary to Title VI. For the be-
latedly issued views of the Attorney General, see notes 44 & 45 supra.
G0Most of the facilities on the HEW docket are general hospitals, although a
small number of complaints have been received with respect to nursing homes, clinics,
health centers and long-term care institutions.
51 Sample complaints, filed in the name of organizations such as the NAACP,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the Medical Committee for
Human Rights, briefly alleged the character of discriminatory practice, requested
that the Department investigate and, if investigation substantiated allegations of
discrimination, cut off funds. During the pendency of the investigation, it was requested
that funds be withheld.
52 Quigley, supra note 48.
(3 Southern and border state medical facilities: hospitals, nursing homes, health
centers, clinics, long-term care institutions.
5 4 Excluding cut-off to facilities refusing to file satisfactory "Assurance of Non-
discrimination."
55 In at least 100 cases, funds have been withheld. Only approximate statistics are
available.
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TABLE II
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT SUITS INSTITUTED BY
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 56
JULY 2, 1964 THROUGH MARCH 1, 1966
MEDICAL FACILITIES
Potential Discriminators " 6,000
Title II 0
Title VI 0
Title IX 58  0
Complaint-oriented administration, as Table I demonstrates, is a
failure. It reaches but a fraction of potentially discriminating facilities
and permits the remainder to continue racially discriminatory prac-
tices unchecked. Even with respect to those facilities reached by the
complaint process, Title VI, as presently administered,59 does not
appear to have had a satisfactory impact.6" Although Table I shows
56The number of complaints or referrals received by the Department is un-
known.
57 Southern and border state medical facilities.
58 Intervention.
59 As a complete statistical breakdown is unavailable, this article makes no attempt
to examine or appraise the manner in which the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare certified southern hospitals for participation in the Medicare program
from May 1 through July 1, 1966. Although the Department made hundreds of site
inspections during this period, regardless of whether or not complaints had been
received, civil rights groups have been openly critical of the fact that only a fraction
have been denied funds. The New Republic, Aug. 27, 1966, p. 8; N.Y. Times, July
28, 1966, p. 18, col. 1. Such criticism led the Surgeon General to order an investi-
gation into the practices of eight Atlanta hospitals which had been cleared for Medi-
care, despite clear evidence that Negro physicians were still excluded and that white
staff physicians were referring patients among hospitals on the basis of race. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA HOSPITALS (1966).
'I Ineffectual administration even with respect to facilities complained against is
demonstrated by the following HEW report which describes one of a dozen cases
where private litigation was required to desegregate a hospital violating Title VI:
This is in reference to the complaint filed by your organization against the
Lee Memorial Hospital, Fort Myers, Florida. It was alleged that "Negroes
are denied admission, except for surgery, and only then if a white physician
requests their admission."
The Lee Memorial Hospital is a non-profit institution and consists of
two units, the Lee Hospital and the Jones-Walker Hospital Annex. The
latter provides hospital services only to non-whites while the Lee Memorial
Hospital admitted white patients only. These facilities were first visited in
July 1965 by representatives of the Department, and the violations contained
in the complaint were verified. A subsequent visit in October 1965 revealed
that to some extent the hospital authorities had taken steps to comply with
Title VI. Notice was given to the community announcing the hospital's new
desegregation policy and several Negro patients have been admitted to the
Lee Memorial Hospital. However, unless requested by the physician, Negro
patients were sent to the Jones-Walker Annex. On this basis, the Depart-
ment was unable to find the hospital in compliance.
Subsequent to our second visit, several events occurred which affected the
Lee Memorial Hospital. First the hospital was ordered by the U. S. District
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that only one-third are in compliance with federal law, there has been
no attempt to apply Title VI sanctions to the others. In at least 100
cases, most of which resulted in compliance findings, the Department
has held up payment of funds pending determination of actual
compliance from new applicants with respect to whom it has
received complaints,6 ' but as most federal grantees receive payments
Court to cease its discriminatory practices at both hospitals, and second, the
40-bed addition to the Lee Memorial Hospital was completed. On January
15, 1966, the Negro patients in the Jones-Walker Annex were moved to the
Lee Hospital and fully integrated with other patients. Again, on February
23, 1966, representatives of this office visited the hospital which revealed
biracial room occupancy, nurses servicing both races, and admission policies
reduced in writing. The Jones-Walker Annex has been closed and turned
over to the County which will lease the property to the local school board.
Our review of these reports indicates that the hospital is now in com-
pliance with the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
we are, therefore, removing it from the complaint list.
61 It may be instructive to consider the course of one of HEW's more successful
applications of Title VI. On March 3, 1965, the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund, Inc. and the NAACP complained that at the 375 bed Medical College
Hospital, teaching hospital for the Medical College of South Carolina of Charleston,
South Carolina, "Negroes are consistently placed in the east wing on the fifth and
sixth floors where visiting hours are restricted to one hour a day. The sections of
the hospital used by whites permit up to three hours a day for visiting."
On May 14, 1965, the regional office of HEW in Atlanta informed the admin-
istrator of the complaint and that a site review of hospital practices would be held.
In preparation for this review, the regional director requested a listing of federal
funds received by the hospital, and copies of its Title VI assurance of compliance
and any written procedures, documents or circulars which related to compliance.
On May 21, 1965, the hospital superintendent replied generally to the letter of
the regional director explaining that the allegations of the complaint with respect
to visiting hours pertain to a distinction made between charity and paying patients:
"It is a natural social phenomena that patients in the lower economic levels receive
the most demands in hospitals. It is for this reason plus the fact that our teaching
wards generally run a high census that we found it necessary to control and limit
visitation on these particular wards." While it does not appear that the superintendent
made the requested information available, he did provide a census for personnel which
showed Negroes employed primarily as maids and porters.
On May 26, 1965, three departmental investigators met with hospital officials and
proceeded to investigate the hospital's compliance with Title VI. They determined
that the institution had been completed with the assistance of Hill-Burton funds and
that the hospital received additional federal funds each year for vocational rehabili-
tation, patient care, crippled children, cancer and general research. On the day of
the visit the hospital had 368 patients of which an estimated 150 to 160 were Negroes.
Of the 100 medical doctors on the staff of the hospital there were no Negroes. The
same was true for the 18 interns, 75 residents, 160 medical students and 180 school
of nursing students.
At the visit, the Superintendent revealed that visiting hours had been standardized
for all patients subsequent to the complaint. He also stated that a Negro female
student had been admitted to the school of medicine and would be taught at the
hospital.
The investigation discovered that the hospital used a local private hospital, the
Roper Hospital, for services and medical student training and that Roper admits
only white patients. It was also observed that no Negro patients had been admitted
to the tenth floor of Medical College Hospital, the psychiatric facility. Other floors
were integrated but only a small amount was noticed in semi-private rooms and
wards. Although exceptions were noted, courtesy titles appeared to be employed
generally. Evidence of Negro and white employees using different cafeterias was
observed and it appeared that the hospital continued segregation by maintaining two
facilities, one for pay patients and one for charity patients.
On June 15, 1965, on the basis of the investigators' report, the regional director
telegramed the President of the Medical College pointing up exclusion of Negroes
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under continuing grant programs this practice is of limited
application.'
The Attorney General did not issue guidelines for the enforcement
of Title VI until December 27, 19 65 .' These guidelines make clear
that initial applications in the case of new or existing programs of
continuing assistance may be deferred by an agency in order to assure
nondiscrimination. Prior to their issuance legal officers of the Depart-
ment had cast doubt on the authority of Title VI administrators to
take such action prior to a full hearing. Although departmental per-
sonnel are reluctant to discuss their practice during the period prior
to issuance of these guidelines when it appeared that deferral in order
to obtain compliance might be illegal, an assessment of the Depart-
ment's action with respect to complaints filed by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the NAACP suggests that
funds were withheld and applications deferred when an initial applica-
tion was received from a facility on the complaint list and, hap-
hazardly, from facilities not on the complaint list but applying for a
grant under the Hill-Burton program. Because these deferrals took
place under the shadow of a restrictive interpretation by department
lawyers and because the Attorney General had not issued guidelines,
documentation of the extent of such deferrals is not available.
An argument put forward to explain the failure of the Department
to commence proceedings to terminate federal grants relies on the
Civil Rights Act directive that no action be taken to apply Title VI
sanctions until it has been "determined that compliance cannot be
from the psychiatric service, cafeteria policy and continued use of Roper Hospital
for training and recommended that elimination of these conditions would enable him
to recommend that the facility was in compliance. Two days later the President
telegramed the regional director that a Negro had been admitted to the psychiatric
service, "positive pressures have been applied to mixing of races in both cafeterias"
and Roper Hospital had been advised that relations would be severed.
Reading of the investigative reports makes clear that the prompt resolution of
noncompliance was a consequence of the hospital's dependence on a series of annual
federal grants, and prompt, vigorous prosecution by the regional director who re-
peatedly implied that funds would be cut if discrimination continued. Withholding
of these funds, even for a short period, would have had serious consequences to a
teaching hospital, for research and other grants enable it to attract and maintain a
staff of residents and interns and to provide the services which make such hospitals
centers of medical talent.
02 The Department has expressed a willingness to delay funds sought by applicants
for initial grants until de facto nondiscrimination is assured because it can do so for
a reasonable period without awaiting the outcome of administrative proceedings.
45 C.F.R. § 80.8(b) (Supp. 1966). This practice, however, has been rendered of
little consequence by the decision to apply it only to facilities as to which complaints
have been filed. An exception has been initial Hill-Burton Act grants where "non-
discrimination" site visits have taken place when complaints have been filed in some
but not all cases. The extent of the Department's willingness actually to deny funds
to new applicants will be tested as thousands of southern hospitals, as to which com-
plaints have not been received, begin to receive funds under the Medicare program.
See note 59 supra.
13 Guidelines for the Enforcement of Title VI Issued by Attorney General Katzen-
bach, December 27, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
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secured by voluntary means." 64 Meaningful voluntary compliance
and procedures calculated to obtain it are never to be scorned, especially
with respect to medical facilities, since Title VI sanctions would deny
funds to many institutions which require them to provide decent
health services. Unfortunately, the moment administrators take volun-
tary compliance as an end in itself, rather than as an appropriate
means of initially inducing nondiscrimination, manipulation of con-
ciliation efforts quickly becomes a discriminator's primary tactic for
avoiding change. A reading of a departmental investigation file is
revealing. After inspection verifies claimed discrimination, many
hospitals formally reiterate their adherence to the terms of the original
nondiscrimination assurance. Subsequent inspection by the Depart-
ment, however, usually fails to show compliance. Of the first twelve
hospitals which the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. and the NAACP brought to the attention of the Department
(February 12, 1965), only four are now compliant.
Federal officials often complain that Title VI imposes procedural
barriers to the use of sanctions, hurdles which, it is argued, frustrate
attempts to force large numbers of facilities to comply with its terms.65
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, however, is in
a poor position to complain of burdensome administrative hearings,
at which it would be required to make a record of noncompliance, for
the Department has not held any hearings involving medical facilities.
More significantly, Title VI hearing requirements need not impede
efforts to apply sanctions, if there is a will to apply them, in a reason-
able number of cases. It is not readily apparent why the Department
is unable to submit the reports of its investigators, along with such
evidence as a grantee hospital wishes to submit, to a hearing officer.
A finding of discrimination entered on the basis of such a record
would in most cases, the factual issue of discrimination being reasonably
clear cut, withstand judicial review.66 Title VI procedures, with an
exception discussed below, are similar to those which govern adminis-
trative adjudication throughout the federal government."7 While
the Department might not have the resources to proceed against every
6478 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §2000d-l; 45 C.F.R. §80.6(a) (Supp. 1966).
05 Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 (1964), provides that "termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance" requires "an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing,
or a failure to comply with such requirement" and "no such action shall become
effective until thirty days have elapsed after filing" a "full written report of the cir-
cumstances and the grounds for such action" with the committee of the House and
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program involved.
06 Review of such a determination is authorized by the court of appeals for the
circuit in which the facility is located. 78 Stat 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2
(1964). See 60 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
6760 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004-07 (1964).
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facility which discriminated, the value of even a small number of such
proceedings pour decourager les autres is obvious. As the matter
stands, the deterrent force of Title VI is solely a matter of exhortation,
for no one has been made to pay its penalty save the few facilities
which refused initially to execute an assurance.
A far more likely explanation for the reluctance of the Depart-
ment to refuse assistance because of continued discrimination is the
Title VI requirement that a full written report of the circumstances
and the grounds for such action be filed with the committees of the
House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program
involved." This novel provision invites pressures from Congress
which federal bureaucrats are trained to avoid. The required notice
to the very legislators who influence, if not determine, future con-
gressional decisions with respect to the agency or department in ques-
tion provides a powerful incentive to avoid a cut-off. In order to
parry the inevitable criticism which a termination of assistance would
entail, administrators require support within Congress and the higher
levels of the Executive Branch. The failure of the Department to
proceed against any health facility forces the conclusion that the neces-
sary encouragement has been lacking. 9
Another reason which is given for the failure of the Department
to impose the Title VI cut-off sanction on recalcitrant medical facilities
is the extreme injury and dislocation which would be caused by termi-
nating assistance. It is urged that Title VI sanctions are too power-
ful to accomplish their stated objective of nondiscriminatory opera-
tion of medical facilities. Much of the force of this position is dissi-
pated by the absence of any program of court enforcement of Title VI.
That is, if the termination of assistance is viewed as an unduly harsh
sanction, one would expect administrators anxious to change patterns
of discrimination to impose, at the very least, a more moderate means
of forcing compliance. It is difficult, however, to accept the argument
even with regard to termination of funds. When Title VI was first
proposed, President Kennedy thought it drastic and rejected its use
on this ground. But Congress in 1964 clearly considered this objec-
6878 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (1964).
69 One need not challenge the good faith of the people who administer Title VI.
They experience a real conflict in goals for no one wants to deny federal assistance
to hospitals, but the extent to which discrimination defeats the usual goals of federal
assistance is not fully understood. Discrimination denies the fruits of federal funds
to those who need it most and impedes creation of the very social conditions in whose
name most federal programs are justified. Finally, Title VI reflects the congressional
judgment that recipients of federal assistance shall be obliged to carry out their
functions without discrimination on the basis of race. Whatever may be said to
justify the tolerance of such discrimination implicit in the failure of the Department
to commence proceedings to terminate federal grants, it cannot be denied that this
failure conflicts with Title VI itself.
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tion and determined that assurance of equality was paramount to the
uninterrupted flow of public assistance, at least in those cases where
a meaningful conciliation process had proven unsuccessful.70 Sec-
ondly, the deterrent effect of termination is largely untested. One
would suppose that if cut-off is a drastic remedy, sparing but calcu-
lated use would foster change in a variety of institutions. As the
matter stands, total failure to apply these sanctions has created a
vacuum where facially unmistakable provisions of federal law have
been effectively repealed by a political and administrative process
largely invisible to the public.
The alternative sanction available to enforce Title VI is litiga-
tion. Whatever "political" or other excuses there may be for reluctance
to terminate or withhold assistance do not apply to action in the courts
because the Attorney General may compel nondiscrimination without
interrupting the flow of funds. 71  Judicial enforcement of Title VI
also avoids the procedural requirements necessary for termination
of assistance but does present problems of its own. The Attorney
General can only maintain a limited number of such suits at any one
time and prompt relief is more likely the exception than the rule. Still,
actions against flagrant violators of Title VI and large community
institutions would accomplish a great deal of actual desegregation
because a series of such suits would have an inevitable deterrent effect.
However restricted the manpower available to the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice the fact remains that during the
period under discussion (July 2, 1960-March 1, 1966), the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., a private legal aid organi-
zation, maintained approximately thirty-five actions against southern
medical facilities. When the record of inaction reflected by Table II
is compared with the broad statutory authority of the Department,72
the conclusion is irresistible that the absence of political support for
application of Title VI sanctions observed with respect to denial of
assistance has thwarted even the relatively mild remedy of enforcement
litigation.
70 See note 6 mpra.
71 The Attorney General may use one of the following devices:
1. Suit to obtain specific enforcement of assurances, covenants running with
federally provided property, statements of compliance or desegregation
plans filed pursuant to agency regulations.
2. Suit to enforce compliance with other titles of the 1964 act, other civil
rights acts or constitutional or statutory provisions requiring nondiscrimi-
nation.
3. Initiation of, or intervention or other participation in, a suit for other
relief designed to secure complaince. Guidelines for Enforcement of Title
VI Issued by Attorney General Katzenbach, December 27, 1965, on file in
Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.8
(Supp. 1966).
72 See note 71 supra.
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It is apparent that Title VI is potentially a powerful engine of social
change, capable of modifying a great many of the discriminatory
conditions faced by the southern Negro. As a device for elimination
of discrimination in southern medical facilities, Title VI is especially
promising since few of the region's health institutions are independent
of federal contribution. Starting from this premise, we have reviewed
some justifications put forth for the failure of government to make
other than minor use of Title VI sanctions in the face of overwhelming
evidence that racial discrimination in health continues unabated. None
appears to account for the absence of enforcement activity, suggesting,
therefore, a failure of political support. Although this is not the
place for speculation about the character or cause of the lack of
encouragement for Title VI enforcement, it is apparent that more
attention must be paid to the implementation of desirable civil rights
principles subsequent to their enactment into law. Insufficient scrutiny
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Depart-
ment of Justice has in part permitted the reported practices to go
largely unchallenged until accomplished fact. Uncertainty as to who
makes or unmakes the critical decisions, and when they are made, is a
serious block to understanding and thus to change. Unless we demand
more from the political and administrative processes charged to imple-
ment principles of equality, proscribed discrimination will continue, a
condition which imperils the "existence of government" itself.73
73 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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